"unconscious decisions" is logically contradictory. If it is unconscious, it isn't a decision. And the fact that people are able to choose doesn't mean that those choices aren't influenced by entirely deterministic stimulus. Compatabilists' ability to defend their belief of free will is no different than a fatalists ability to defend theirs or a theist to defend theirs. Just as the concept of Fate is unfalsifiable, so is free will. There is nothing scientific about the concept of free will.
*Follow up to Anon’s question from yesterday
I should have been more clear about what I meant by “unconscious decisions” but perhaps you’ll agree that they do exist after I clarify myself. If I kick my leg in response to a tap on the knee that would be a reflex, totally lacking in mental processing or assessment. However if I, without conscious deliberation, choose coffee over tea in the morning or go right rather than left on a basketball court that can hardly be said to be a reflex, it seems to me to be a decision. Those latter actions involve unconscious processing and assessment of information in the brain in a way not present in mere reflexes. However, perhaps you want to reserve the term “decisions” specifically for conscious reflection but I see no problem with calling a choice of action by my unconscious mind a decision. Still, as I said in my response to anon, the unconscious part of your mind is still you and hence whatever you choose to call its processes and their results are still part of you.
And the fact that people are able to choose doesn’t mean that those choices aren’t influenced by entirely deterministic stimulus.
I never said they weren’t. Even though if you press me I’ll tell you determinism isn’t even true, or at least that’s my best understanding of what quantum mechanics is tells us (Did I just commit the Deepak Chopra fallacy?). Compatibilists can and do accept that deterministic and random inputs effect the brain or even are the ultimate cause of their results. The claim is, as Daniel Dennett likes to put it, that we have the varieties of free will worth wanting. These include deliberative reasoning, imagining different futures and choosing to select a course of action that will bring about your preferred future, etc.
As for your last string of commentary I must admit I don’t know what you are talking about. Unlike fatalists, compatibilists aren’t making claims that would fit the data no matter what it showed. If you could demonstrate we don’t have the kinds of traits I listed above that would falsify compatibilists claims of free will. Nothing could, even in principle, contradict fatalism.
Lastly, science isn’t the sphere of all knowledge so even if it were true that free will wasn’t scientific that wouldn’t demonstrate that it didn’t exist. However, in this case neuroscience does have a significant role to play (in the future) about whether or not we really do have the capacity for executive control and it already has had a large impact on demonstrating our “will” isn’t the origin of our impulses (this is the type of subject the Libet experiments demonstrate).
Thanks for the question.